Seems to me that all notions of an epistemological religious pluralism seeks to:
convert the inconsistent doctrines of the different religions into myths and then to claim that these myths only trivially differ from one another in their schematizations of the noumenal Real . . . This move neatly dispenses altogether with the issue of the specific truth-claims expressed by the often contrary doctrines of the religious traditions. Thus all . . . religions, despite their marked differences in basic teachings are more or less valid . . . not for any intrinsic reason connected with what they specifically teach but because they all evoke human self-transcendence in relation to the Real.
Kenneth Thomas Rose, “Knowing the Real: John Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and Religious Pluralism,” Ph.D. dissertation, (Harvard University, 1992), 110-111.
I make this exact argument by pointing out a dilemma for religious pluralists like Hick. They must ultimately make all religious claims false. Check out my post: http://jwwartick.com/2012/09/17/presumption-of-pluralism/
Hey, J.W….thanks for the pointer. I’ll take a look. I did my thesis critiquing John Hick’s Christology arguing that a Chalcedon Christ pulls the rug out from under all “inane notions of religious pluralism.”